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[A]1. Introduction 
 
 
Australia is undergoing a slow but significant change in employment conditions. For 
much of the twentieth century, the employment system, anchored in a broader 
“labourist/protectionist” regime that depended on tariff protection and significant state 
involvement in the economy (Lloyd, 2002), was stable and prosperous. At the level of 
labour regulation, the employment system was characterized by strong minimum 
standards and “fairness”, supported by a generous social security system (Castles, 
1985). It sustained a solid base of what, according to the standards of the time, were 
“good” jobs with high wages and a high standard of living for employees (and their 
households and communities). Labour regulation protecting employees was relatively 
comprehensive and relatively egalitarian, though with several gaps that allowed 
discriminatory treatment of indigenous workers and women. The employment system 
most closely resembled a European-style social democracy, though with distinct 
features as a result of the specific position of Australia in the global economy and the 
specific history of its labour-market institutions.  
 
This system is being transformed. The change is accompanied by an intensification of 
inequalities within the workforce across several major dimensions of employment. 
This seems to go beyond a simple diversification of employment opportunities in 
response to the needs of a modern, diversified workforce. Instead, it is linked to what 
has been usefully termed a fragmentation of the workforce and the emergence of jobs 
that fall below the inherited norms of decent work (Watson et al., 2003).   
 
The roots of this process go back more than two decades. In the most recent period, 
especially as the effects of the 1991 to 1992 recession have dissipated, the process of 
fragmentation has been overshadowed by the general conditions of economic stability 
and employment growth. Many individuals have enjoyed increased real wages (and 
ready access to credit). But quite apart from concerns about whether this stability and 
growth is sustainable and whether it is adequate from the broader perspective of job 
quality and quality of life, scholars suggest that some workers are missing out on the 
benefits of employment growth and even those workers that appear to be benefiting 
through increased wages are losing out in other respects (Borland, Gregory and 
Sheehan, 2001; Watson et al., 2003).  
 
This chapter examines the change in employment conditions in Australia. Section 2 
summarizes some of the driving forces behind change, such as globalization and 
changing public policy. In particular, it looks at modifications to labour regulation, 
including the radical changes that are flowing from federal legislation that came into 
effect in late March 2006 (“Work Choices”). Section 3 outlines the labour-market 
context in the most recent period, characterized by strong employment growth and 
low unemployment.  It then goes on to examine the record of change for individual 
workers in selected dimensions of working conditions, drawing mainly on secondary 
data developed in conjunction with the monthly Labour Force Survey by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). This section focuses on the divisions 
separating standard employment, understood here as full-time waged work under a 
permanent (or continuing) contract of employment, and the varied types of non-
standard employment, such as self-employment and temporary waged work. It is 
argued that fragmentation, and the associated emergence of poor quality jobs, has 
proceeded in two main ways: first, through an expansion of non-standard types of 
employment, marked by inferior employment conditions and, second, more recently, 
through a redefinition and reduction of employment conditions within specific 
categories of employment, including in particular standard employment itself. Section 
4 touches on selected policy debates, including on productivity growth and skill 
shortages. The chapter concludes (section 5) by examining alternative policy paths 
proposed in the current debates.  
 
[A]2. Globalization and labour market reforms in Australia  
 
[B]Changing public policy 
 Governments in Australia, primarily at federal level but also sometimes state 
governments, have sought to respond to changing economic conditions and 
globalization. The main emphasis has been on integrating Australia more firmly into 
world markets. Initiatives to support free trade, wind down tariff protection and 
remove financial controls have unfolded steadily since the early 1980s, initially under 
the federal Labor government (1983–1996) and then under the federal 
Liberal/National Coalition government (1996–2007). These initiatives have been 
supplemented by a vigorous programme of privatization.  Neoliberal ideas of a 
withdrawal of state involvement in the economy and an enhancement of market 
forces, conceptualised as “deregulation”, have been influential on governments from 
both sides of politics (Bell, 1997).   
 
Responsibility for labour regulation is shared between federal and state governments 
(Creighton and Stewart, 2005). Though federal involvement is limited under the 
Constitution, it quickly became the main source of innovation in this field, and since 
the late 1980s it has been the main site for a process of “labour market deregulation”, 
aimed at paring back the protective elements of formal labour regulation. The process 
has been slow, but it has centred on dismantling the rather distinctive system of 
awards that was developed in the early 1900s and has been fundamental to labour 
regulation in Australia for most of the following 100 years (Campbell and Brosnan, 
1999).1  
 
An award can be defined as “a legal document setting out the minimum rates of pay 
and conditions of employment which apply to employees in a particular industry or 
occupation”. Awards were legally binding documents set down by permanent, 
independent quasi-judicial tribunals operating with powers of compulsory conciliation 
and arbitration. Award regulation could apply at both federal and state levels, although 
the former was most important and largely set the pace for the state tribunals. At the 
federal level the tribunal has been known as the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC). Award regulation extended throughout the economy, according to 
                                                 
1 The following discussion is confined to federal rather than state level. Moreover, it focuses 
on the central labour-market institution, the (federal) award system, rather than other labour-
market institutions or, more broadly, taxation and social security policies.  
the coverage of the tribunal decisions, which could be occupationally, industrially, 
enterprise- or even nationally (through National Wage Cases) based. Individual awards 
numbered in the hundreds and formed a complex patchwork, which regulated the 
employment conditions of most – though by no means all – employees in Australia. A 
particular workplace could be governed by a multiplicity of awards. Individual awards 
were interlinked by common principles and attention to the preservation of pay 
relativities (under the principle of “comparative wage justice”). Each award typically 
contained a multitude of provisions, extending beyond basic employment issues to cover 
matters that in other countries might be regulated through statute or the social welfare 
system. By contrast, statutory regulation in Australia played only a limited role. It was 
largely confined to legislation at state level and to a few matters such as public holidays, 
minimum standards of annual or long service leave, occupational health and safety, and 
workers’ compensation. Finally, underpinning award and statutory regulation was the 
primitive form of regulation provided by the common law (Creighton and Stewart, 
2005). 
 
The award system is best understood as the somewhat messy way in which Australian 
society provided for the dynamic labour standards that could ensure a platform of 
“decent” work (Cooney, Howe and Murray, 2006).  Though it had a distinctly statist 
form, it operated in ways that are similar to conventional systems that mix together 
statutory regulation and collective bargaining. Indeed the award system is best seen as 
a collective bargaining system (Clegg, 1976; Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001). At 
the same time, this system was complicated and layered – it was fragmented. Partly as 
a result, it was also rather porous, leaving sizeable gaps as a result of poor coverage, 
poor enforcement and numerous exemptions. Table 4.1 provides ABS data from an 
employer survey conducted in 1990. It shows a reasonably comprehensive coverage 
of employees of around 80 per cent. But this still left a large gap. The remaining 20 
per cent of employees was protected only by the rudimentary provisions offered by 
statutory regulation and by the common law individual contracts of employment. This 
group included most managerial and executive employees, but it also included a 
substantial number of non-managerial employees who seemed to be located 
predominantly in small private sector workplaces and predominantly at the bottom of 
the income and occupational hierarchy.2  
 
TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Was the award system too rigid? Certainly it was deficient in several ways. The fact 
that it was complicated and layered made it opaque (Campbell and Brosnan, 1999). 
The fact that one workplace could be governed by several awards (as well as other 
regulatory instruments) often offered a formidable challenge to the understanding of 
managers, employee representatives and shop-floor workers. Certainly the award 
system constrained the choices of employers, but it did not neglect their interests; 
thus, it allowed for different forms of flexibility to respond to business needs, such as 
shift work and overtime, and it left substantial room for enterprise-level bargaining 
and arrangements. From one point of view, its central deficiency was precisely that it 
was too flexible. Thus the many gaps in the system allowed too many opportunities 
for favourably situated firms to avoid protective regulation. This fostered unfair 
advantages for certain firms and amplified pressures on the remaining firms, often 
larger and more open to public scrutiny, that complied with labour standards. The 
calls from large firms for “labour-market deregulation” in the 1980s can be seen as 
aimed at equalizing these advantages – a demand that what could be called implicit 
deregulation should be matched by explicit deregulation. 
 
The award system was ramshackle and undoubtedly required modernization. It 
needed to be adapted to new occupations and industries, changing workforce 
composition and new worker needs. However, apart from a burst of “award 
restructuring” in the late 1980s, public policy has aimed not so much at modernization 
as at abolition. The dismantling proceeded in a series of steps. At the crucial federal 
level, it started with the federal Labor government in the early 1990s and then 
continued more enthusiastically and with more emphasis on restriction of trade unions 
                                                 
2 As Table 4.1 indicates, the sectoral dimension is very important. The proportion of 
employees outside coverage in the public sector was minimal (2.2 per cent), but it was more 
substantial (27.6 per cent) in the private sector. As could be expected, there was also a major 
difference according to size in the private sector, with large enterprises (or “employer units”) 
more likely to have the bulk of their employees covered, but many small enterprises reporting 
that their employees were not covered (ABS, 1990). 
under the subsequent Liberal/National Party Coalition government. The latest step, 
referred to here as “Work Choices”,3 was taken by the federal Coalition government 
after their fourth election victory in October 2004, when they finally won control of 
both Houses of Parliament and could more easily implement their policies. This 
radical legislation sparked fierce debate about the future of existing labour standards 
and working conditions in Australia, and it proved to be a major issue in the 
November 2007 election, when the Coalition was replaced by a new Labor 
government.  The incoming government has promised to introduce legislation in 2008 
to remove ‘Work Choices’, but as yet it remains unclear what the legislation will 
contain and how different the new system will be.     
 
[B]Dismantling of the award system 
 
Roughly summarized, the dismantling of the award system targets two crucial 
elements: coverage and the substantive content of labour standards.4  
 
[C]Coverage  
 
The formal changes since 1990 preserve awards (though these have lost most of their 
broad social functions and have become increasingly residual).  But they add on at 
least three further streams of regulation: (a) (registered) single-employer agreements 
with unions; (b) (registered) single-employer agreements with a group of workers 
organized outside of unions; and (c) registered individual contracts. These additional 
regulatory streams are oriented to individual enterprises, and they have introduced a 
significant element of decentralization – as well as a significant element of enhanced 
employer power – into the regulatory system. The Labor government sponsored the 
addition of the first two streams, arguing that they represented a new system of 
“enterprise bargaining” to supplement the traditional awards. The Coalition 
government, in its initial Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 
                                                 
3 We refer loosely to the entire bundle of changes as “Work Choices”. The main piece of 
legislation is based on an amendment to the existing Workplace Relations Act, entitled the 
Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005. However, the regulations that 
accompany the legislation, as well as other pieces of legislation dealing with issues such as 
independent contractors and the building and construction industry, are also important. 
4 Another crucial element is its negative impacts on worker representation and collective 
bargaining. This issue is not discussed in this chapter for the reason of space limitation. 
1996, revised and strengthened the provisions for non-union agreements and 
introduced the third stream of registered individual contracts, entitled Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs). The 2005 Work Choices legislation consolidates 
this framework, seeking to expand the favoured stream of registered individual 
agreements. In addition, it uses the corporations’ power in the Constitution to expand 
the federal system at the expense of the state systems. This extends the reach of the 
federal system to around 80 per cent of all employees and displaces some of the more 
generous provisions and procedures available through state awards and agreements 
and through state legislation. 
 
Registered agreements could be concluded by trade unions, but they could also be 
concluded by individual employers working either with a group of employees or with 
employees singly. Agreements are often described as the result of “bargaining”, but 
there is little sign of any bargaining with either non-union agreements or AWAs.  The 
latter are generally template agreements offered to individual employees to sign, and 
indeed current jurisprudence ratifies the practice of offering new employees an AWA 
as a condition of being employed (Mitchell et al., 2005).  The most recent legislation 
further relaxes the requirements regarding procedures for reaching agreement. The 
“collective agreements”, which included both union and non-union agreements, were 
traditionally registered with the AIRC, but a new body, the Office of the Employment 
Advocate (OEA), was established after 1996 to register AWAs and this body has now 
been given the responsibility for filing all agreements.  
 
The present distribution of workers among the different streams of regulation is 
difficult to calculate, because of the possibility for workers to be in several streams at 
once, for example with part of their pay and conditions regulated by awards and part 
regulated by some other form of agreement. Table 4.2 offers some hints. It suggests 
that the proportion of employees paid exactly the award rate in 2006 was relatively 
small – 19 per cent.5 What were the main alternatives to awards? The category of 
registered individual agreements (mainly federal AWAs) was of only minor 
                                                 
5 This should not be taken as an exact reflection of the relative significance of awards. Many 
who had their pay set by awards plus another method would be classified to the other method. 
Moreover, for many employees awards can still be significant for non-monetary benefits and 
conditions and can still be a reference point for pay.  
importance (3.1 per cent). One large category was unregistered individual agreements, 
which covered 31.7 per cent of employees, but this is likely to be a heterogeneous 
group, made up of some employees in an unregulated sphere, governed primarily by 
common law individual contracts, together with some employees whose pay is 
primarily set by award or agreement but who enjoy an extra (“over-award”) payment 
granted by their employer. After that we have registered collective agreements, which 
account for 38.1 per cent of employees. These data do not distinguish between union 
and non-union registered collective agreements (but it is likely that the union 
agreements are far more numerous).  
 
TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
If we compare Table 4.2 with Table 4.1 we can get a rough perspective on the 
changes since 1990. In the public sector, there appears to have been a decisive 
movement of workplaces and employees into registered collective agreements. In the 
private sector the change appears less dramatic and is more fractured. Awards remain 
important, especially in industries such as hospitality and retail, which contain large 
numbers of female, often low-paid, workers. Where there is a passage away from 
awards in the private sector, it has been made up both of movement into the less 
regulated sphere of unregistered individual agreements and of movement into 
registered collective agreements.  
 
 [C]Substantive content  
 
For those moving from awards into agreements the Labor government introduced a 
“No Disadvantage Test” on agreements, as a reassurance that agreements would not 
be used to lower wages and conditions in comparison with awards. Awards were 
thereby presented as a “safety net” for enterprise bargaining. The “No Disadvantage 
Test” contained weaknesses from the start, and it was progressively watered down by 
both Labor and Coalition governments. In addition, the effectiveness of awards as a 
safety net was undermined by changes in their mode of operation. Some of these 
changes were indirect, as a result of the barriers to updating award provisions and as a 
result of the weakening of enforcement mechanisms. However, others were more 
direct and served to reduce the substantive content of the labour standards in awards. 
Under the Labor government, the AIRC had been encouraged to “liberalize” clauses 
in awards, but the major change came in 1996 with the advent of the Coalition 
government, which launched a process of “award simplification”. This involved a 
restriction of the powers of the AIRC to 20 “allowable award matters”. Other award 
provisions were proscribed and were required to be removed from existing awards by 
June 1998 (although some could be regained through negotiation with individual 
employers issuing in certified agreements and AWAs).  
 
The 2005 Work Choices legislation introduces further impediments to altering and 
updating awards and continues the narrowing down of “allowable matters”. However, 
the main effect is elsewhere. The legislation discards the “No Disadvantage Test(s)” 
and thereby severs the (attenuated) links that connected agreements and awards. In 
response to public concerns, the federal government retreated slightly in 2007 and 
introduced a new “Fairness Test” (Sutherland, 2007). However, the main mechanism 
that is intended to provide a floor or safety net under agreements is the Australian Fair 
Pay and Conditions Standard (AFPCS). This covers a minimum wage, paid annual 
leave, paid personal leave, unpaid parental leave and a maximum limit on ordinary 
weekly working hours. Scholars (Fenwick, 2006; Stewart, 2006; Cooney, Howe and 
Murray, 2006) have pointed to the limited range of these provisions. They suggest, 
even in these five cases, that the appearance of minimum standards is deceptive, since 
the provisions do not apply to all workers, and, where they do, there are ample 
opportunities for derogation. For example, the four-week annual leave provision does 
not apply to casual workers and can in any case be partly “cashed out”. Nor is there 
any plausible mechanism for adjustment, except in the case of minimum wages 
(including junior, training and disability wages, casual loadings, and pay and 
classification scales), which are the province of a new body, the Australian Fair Pay 
Commission (AFPC) (Waring, de Ruyter and Burgess, 2005).   
 
One major initiative concerns new rules around “unfair dismissal”. Firms with fewer 
than 100 employees are exempt from requirements to avoid “unfair dismissal”, and 
firms with larger numbers are allowed to introduce new arguments such as 
“operational reasons” to reach the same outcome (Chapman, 2006). This undermines 
the employment security of large numbers of employees, who had previously enjoyed 
some protection from dismissal that could be judged “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. 
The initiative responds to a long-standing and fierce campaign by employer 
associations, who had denounced the “unfair dismissal” legislation of 1994 as an 
impediment to job creation, especially in small business.  Yet both the campaign and 
the recent government initiative seem hard to justify: Australia has traditionally been 
near the bottom of OECD rankings in terms of the strictness of its regulations for 
employment protection (OECD, 2004). Furthermore, it does not seem likely, 
according to current research, that a weakening of these already weak provisions will 
stimulate any significant employment growth (Freyens and Oslington, 2005; see 
OECD, 2006, p. 212).  
 
[A]3. Changes in employment conditions for individual workers 
 
This section starts with the labour-market context, seeking to identify the extent and 
significance of the strong employment growth experienced in recent years. It then 
goes on to look at selected dimensions of working conditions: type of employment, 
working time, wages, gender equality and work–family balance, and health and 
safety, in order to throw light on the mixed record of change in employment 
conditions.   
 
[B]Employment and unemployment 
 
The paid workforce has grown strongly in recent years, rising from less than 8 million 
workers in the early 1990s to over 10 million workers (10,172,000) in August 2006 
(ABS, 2006b). This growth has two components – an overall increase in the working-
age population and a steady increase in the employment rate (also called the 
“employment to population ratio”).  
 
The employment rate for working-age (15–64) persons has risen from 64.1 per cent in 
1978 to 72 per cent in 2006 (see Figure 4.1). The current figure is higher than the 
OECD average (and higher than Japan and the Republic of Korea), but it is about the 
same as the United States, and it remains lower than leading nations such as the 
Nordic countries (OECD, 2006, p. 248). Figure 4.1 indicates that, as in other 
countries, the pattern of change is different for men and women. Whereas the 
employment rate for men only slowly recovered from the sharp decline of earlier 
years, the employment rate for working-age women shows a steadier and much 
stronger pattern of growth to reach a peak of 65.4 per cent in 2006 (up from 29 per 
cent in 1954 and 48 per cent in 1980).   
 
FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
New patterns of participation in the workforce underpin these figures. First is the 
trend to increased female participation, which is common to many countries but often 
takes distinctive national forms. In Australia, it is an expression of the long-term 
transformation of the male breadwinner/female homemaker model that had been 
dominant in the first half of the twentieth century. This process of transformation is 
strong but unfinished. Thus female employment rates are still lower in all age groups 
than for men, and employment gaps persist, especially for women with dependent 
children. Moreover, female participation takes particular forms, with many women 
experiencing temporary periods of withdrawal from the labour force when children 
are young and then seeking a gradual re-entry into the workforce, often into part-time 
jobs. These new patterns of participation point to the increased importance of labour-
market transitions (Schmid and Gazier, 2002). 
 
Second, youth labour markets have undergone major changes, which are only partly 
revealed in the changing employment rates for young people. Increased retention rates 
in secondary schools and the expansion of higher education have meant fewer school 
leavers seeking full-time work. But this does not necessarily entail a decline in 
employment rates for young people. More and more full-time students seek to 
combine their study with part-time jobs. Indeed, Australia now has come closer to the 
US as a country with very high rates of student employment, predominantly in part-
time jobs in sectors such as retail and hospitality.  
 
Strong employment growth has been accompanied by falls in unemployment, 
including long-term unemployment. After reaching 10.5 per cent of the labour force 
in August 1993, the official unemployment rate has declined to below 5 per cent (see 
Figure 4.2 below). This is relatively low in international comparison (OECD, 2006, p. 
247).  
 
The raw figures on employment and unemployment suggest a comfortable labour-
market context. Indeed some voices speak of a return of “full employment”. But to 
produce a more balanced assessment, it is important to go beyond such raw figures. 
First, we can note that the record of employment growth is less impressive when 
measured in volume terms rather than just in terms of head count. Much of the growth 
in employment has been in part-time employment, sometimes only with very short 
hours. Thus around 45 per cent of the total employment growth over the period 1994 
to 2005 was in part-time employment (ABS, 2006a). Table 4.3 shows the increase for 
both men and women over this period.  
 
TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The absolute and relative growth of part-time employment is a major feature of 
changing labour markets in Australia, continuing a process that stretches back to the 
1950s. As can be seen, women are the major source of growth, but young workers, 
both female and male, have also contributed. According to the harmonized OECD 
data (OECD, 2006, p. 264), the percentage of the workforce that was part time in 
Australia in 2005 (27.3 per cent) was very high in cross-national comparison. For men 
the figure was 15.7 per cent, just ahead of the Netherlands at the top of the OECD 
rankings, while for women it was 41.7 per cent (behind the Netherlands but near the 
top of the rankings, together with Japan) (ibid., p. 263). 
 
Second, as numerous scholars have noted (Watson, 2000; Denniss, 2001), official 
measures of unemployment are increasingly inadequate as a guide to the health of the 
labour market. One necessary supplement is a measure of “hidden unemployment”, 
which takes account of persons who may wish to take a job but who are counted as 
not in the labour force because they fail to meet the criteria of availability and/or job 
search. As the employment rates indicate, there are still substantial pools of jobless 
persons of working age. The other necessary supplement is a measure of (time-
related) underemployment, which takes account of persons who meet the requirement 
for being counted as employed but who want to work more hours. This is particularly 
significant in Australia, linked to the prevalence of part-time jobs. Figure 4.2 charts 
the changes in the unemployment rate and in two versions of the underemployment 
rate. This shows a strong increase in underemployment, jumping from 1.9 per cent in 
1978 to 6.7 per cent in 2006. As Figure 4.2 indicates, the proportion of the labour 
force that is underemployed is now more than the proportion counted as unemployed. 
This proportion seems higher than for any other industrialized country (ILO, 2005).  
 
FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The ABS has developed a measure of the “extended labour force underutilization 
rate”, which groups together “the unemployed, plus the underemployed, plus a subset 
of persons marginally attached to the labour force, expressed as a proportion of the 
labour force augmented by the marginally attached persons”. This rate declined from 
15.5 per cent in September 1994 to 11.4 per cent in September 2005 (ABS, 2006c). 
This offers a more mixed, but more accurate picture of the health of the labour 
market, indicating that the improvement in labour-market conditions since 1994 was 
largely confined to a drop in official unemployment, with little change in the 
proportions of the labour force that were underemployed or marginally attached.6 
 
A balanced assessment of employment growth also needs to incorporate a discussion 
of job quality.  As the following sections indicate, there is ample reason to be 
concerned about trends in job quality. 
 
[B]Types of employment: Permanent, fixed-term, casual and part-time 
employment   
 
As in other industrialized societies, the employment system in Australia evolved 
around a model of standard employment, roughly defined as full-time, “permanent” 
waged work. Starting with employment security, enshrined in the principle of an 
open-ended employment contract (“permanency”), varied employment rights and 
benefits were consolidated and added on to the framework of standard employment 
over the course of the twentieth century. In this way standard employment became the 
                                                 
6 A good measure of the health of the labour market would also need to introduce a dynamic 
element, which can take account of the growth of phenomena such as intermittent 
employment (Watson et al., 2003, pp. 34–37). 
platform for the achievements of the Australian system in offering good jobs and a 
high standard of living for the bulk of the (male) workforce.7  
 
In addition to standard employment, the employment structure contains varied forms 
of non-standard employment, characterized by less protection and fewer employment 
rights and benefits. As in other advanced capitalist societies, the two main lines of 
division are: (a) the line separating employees from the self-employed; and (b) the 
line separating “permanent” employees from other types of employees, who can be 
called “temporary” (Supiot, 2001). In addition, there is a third line of division within 
the group of permanent employees that separates full-time workers from those 
working hours less than full-time.8 Most non-standard work is within a formal sector, 
and the informal sector is only small. However, as noted above, the labour regulation 
system in Australia has been porous. Self-employment has been little regulated, and 
coverage for employees has been less than comprehensive. Similarly, exemptions 
from regulation and poor enforcement can be seen to create pockets of informality 
even within the heart of the formal system.   
  
These lines of division have taken distinctive forms in Australia, due to the history 
and distinctive institutional forms of labour regulation. The line separating employees 
and non-employees is largely regulated by common law, progressing by means of an 
accretion of court cases that seek to deploy varied tests in order to establish the 
difference between a contract for service and a contract of service, that is an 
employment contract (Bennett, 1994, pp. 171–177). The result has been confusion 
and extensive opportunities for employers to exploit the boundary (Creighton and 
Stewart  2005; Stewart  2002). This has given rise to concerns about the growth of a 
significant group of “dependent contractors” (also called “fake self-employed” or 
“disguised wage labour”), who are dependent on one employer and appear largely 
                                                 
7 Other terms are sometimes used for full-time permanent waged work, such as “regular”, 
“typical” or “traditional” work. I prefer the term “standard” because it gestures towards its 
role as a pivot of the labour regulation system. This allows recognition of the fact that the 
employment rights and benefits that are attached to the basic type of employment can vary, 
for example, over time and between different nations. This connects up with the valuable 
literature on the “standard employment relation” (see Bosch, 2004).  
8 We put aside a few minor categories of non-standard employment that also involve fewer 
rights and benefits and lesser protection, such as apprenticeships and traineeships and 
government-sponsored employment schemes. Temporary agency work is briefly discussed 
below. 
indistinguishable from employees in the way they work within the workplace, but 
who do not enjoy the standard rights and benefits of employees. 
 
The line separating “permanent” employees from “temporary” employees is 
particularly distinctive in Australia. In comparison with other advanced capitalist 
countries, temporary employment is marked by more unusual forms and by a bigger 
gap in protection (Campbell and Burgess, 2001). The two main types of “temporary” 
waged work are fixed-term and casual. Fixed-term employees are familiar in 
international comparison. In Australia they are concentrated in the government and 
not-for-profit sector, especially in areas such as education and community services, 
and they differ from “permanent” employees in those sectors mainly in terms of their 
limited employment security as a result of a contract of employment that is for a 
specified duration (or life of project) (Watson et al., 2003).  
 
However, the Australian category of “casual” work is more unusual. Historically, this 
has been the main type of employment specified in labour regulation as an alternative 
to the standard model of permanent employment (O’Donnell, 2004). As in most 
countries, it is possible to find casual workers in Australia whose poor conditions 
result from their shadowy presence within an informal or illegal sector. However, the 
majority of casual workers in Australia are fully within the mainstream of the formal, 
regulated sector. They are recognized as employees, but in most protective regulation 
– whether legislation or awards and agreements – they are governed by special 
clauses that permit this form of employment, under certain limitations, and then 
specify that these workers are exempted from most rights and entitlements, starting 
with employment protection (rights to notice and compensation in case of dismissal), 
but easily extending into most rights and entitlements, including such basic 
entitlements as paid annual leave. They are categorized as workers entitled to an 
hourly wage (sometimes with a “casual loading”) for each hour spent under the 
direction of the employer at the workplace, but to very little else. In short, they are 
regulated but not effectively protected.9 The existence of this category of workers is a 
                                                 
9 The meaning of “casual” remains contested, and an employer designation of someone as 
“casual” is by no means conclusive (O’Donnell, 2004; Creighton and Stewart, 2005). If 
casual workers are able to prove continuity of service and regular schedules, workers may, in 
the eyes of the courts, acquire rudimentary rights and entitlements. 
surprising but crucial feature of the Australian system. It is difficult to find any other 
OECD country, with the exception of the US, where is legal to deprive employees of 
such standard leave entitlements as paid annual leave and paid public holidays 
(Campbell, 2004). Most casual workers are part time, but a significant and growing 
minority are full time. Casual work incorporates a large group of workers across all 
industries, but with particular concentrations in retail, accommodation, cafés and 
restaurants, and cultural and recreational services.  
 
Both fixed-term and casual types of employment are described here as “temporary” 
because they lack the employment protection associated with standard work. 
However, in practice such workers can assemble long periods of tenure in the job. 
Thus fixed-term contracts can be rolled over repeatedly, while workers in casual jobs 
may slip into regular rosters and long-term relationships with the employer. Data from 
the first wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey suggest that mean years of job tenure for “permanent” employees were 7.3, but 
for fixed-term employees it was 4.4 and even for casuals it was 2.6 years (Wooden 
and Warren, 2003, p. 13).  
 
Table 4.4 presents information on the distribution of workers in the main types of 
employment in Australia from a recent survey (van Wanrooy et al., 2007; see also 
Louie et al., 2006). As can be seen, standard work, that is permanent full-time waged 
work, accounts for less than half of the workforce.  
 
TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The standard workforce has declined in significance in recent decades. Figure 4.3 uses 
one measure of full-time “permanent” employees to show the change since 1984.10 
The numbers rose in the employment boom of the late 1980s, but they declined 
sharply in the recession of the early 1990s and have only slowly recovered in the 
                                                 
10 The measure used in Figure 4.3 has two main deficiencies. First, these data are based on a 
broad definition of “employee” that includes owner-managers of incorporated enterprises. 
Second, the definition of “permanent” relies on entitlement to either paid annual leave or paid 
sick leave (or both), and it thereby includes fixed-term employees. The first problem is 
overcome in more recent data that are cited elsewhere in this chapter. However, because the 
data based on the broader definition of “employee” allow a longer time series, they are used 
in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.   
period since. As a proportion of the workforce, full-time permanent employees have 
declined fairly steadily over the entire period from 64.4 per cent in 1984 to 52.1 per 
cent in 2006. The decline has been most marked for males, but it has been substantial 
even for females. 
 
FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The decline in standard employment as a share of the workforce has been matched by 
a rise in some, though by no means all, forms of non-standard employment. First, the 
proportion of non-employees in the workforce currently stands at around 20 per cent. 
The proportion has been stable since the early 1990s (ABS, 2006a), though within this 
broad category it is likely that groups such as “dependent contractors” have grown in 
significance.  
 
Second, estimates of the proportion of the workforce on a fixed-term contract vary 
widely, with one estimate for 2004 suggesting only 3 per cent and another suggesting 
6.6 per cent (see Productivity Commission, 2006, pp. 130–131; see also Watson et al., 
2003, p. 64). As a result, it is hard to reach conclusions about the long-term trend of 
growth.  
 
Third, the most important type of temporary work is “casual”. The best estimate 
suggests that “casual” employees represent around 20 per cent of the workforce 
(ABS, 2006a). The growth in numbers over the past few years has been moderate, but 
prior to that time there was a trajectory of strong growth that generated a steady 
increase in the proportion of the workforce classified as casual. Figure 4.4 uses one 
measure of “casual” employees to show the change since 1984. The proportion rose 
sharply from 13.1 per cent in 1984 to 22.1 per cent in 1996, with a subsequent smaller 
increase to 23.2 per cent in 2006.  
 
FIGURE 4.4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, part-time employment has expanded rapidly. In 2005 58.6 per cent of all part-
time employees were classified as “casual” and the remainder were classified as 
“permanent” (ABS  2006a). Both groups have grown as part-time work has increased, 
with a particularly strong increase in the permanent part-time workforce in recent 
years. As a result, the proportion of the workforce classified as part-time permanent 
has increased from 6.5 per cent in 1992 to 9.7 per cent in August 2005 (ABS, 2006a).  
 
In sum, the share of the workforce in non-standard employment has expanded, 
particularly in the period prior to 2000. Casual employment is the largest category of 
non-standard employment; its growth made the biggest contribution to the growth of 
non-standard employment in the 1980s, and it has still made a substantial contribution 
over the period since the early 1990s. As noted above, dependent contracting is likely 
to have grown, but the overall numbers remain small.     
 
The growth in both casual work and dependent contracting can be linked with a 
growth of temporary agency work (sometimes referred to in Australia as “labour 
hire”). Temporary agency work is not strictly a separate type of employment, but 
simply a different way of organizing the existing types of employment discussed 
above, based on a triangular relationship joining together the agency, a user firm and 
the worker (Watson et al., 2003, pp. 72–77). It is prominent in particular areas, 
including construction, communications and utilities, agriculture, manufacturing (food 
and beverages, maintenance work), nursing and clerical work. Temporary agency 
work is subject to limited regulation in Australia, and much detail of its operations 
remains obscure (Coe, Johns and Ward, 2007). However, it is clear that only a small 
minority of workers organized by temporary agencies are “permanent” employees. 
The vast majority is casual, but another small group has been recognized as self-
employed contractors, after a fiercely contested court case in the early 1990s. The best 
estimate of the size of the temporary agency workforce suggests that it accounts for 
between 2.5 and 3 per cent of total employment (Hall, 2006, p. 159; see also 
Laplagne, Glover and Fry, 2005), which is relatively high in international comparison. 
Researchers are agreed that that there was rapid growth in the 1990s (Laplagne, 
Glover and Fry, 2005), but there is less agreement about the recent trend, with some 
data pointing to stability over the period 2001 to 2004 (Productivity Commission, 
2006, pp. 108, 139–140).  
 
The decline of standard employment implies a decline of good jobs. Conversely, the 
rise of non-standard employment, generally characterized by limited protection and 
inferior employment rights and benefits, implies a rise of poorer quality jobs. This is 
sometimes discussed in terms of increased precariousness (for example, Louie et al., 
2006). Each category carries its own concerns. However, we can note that that the 
biggest category is the Australian version of casual, and this tends to carry with it the 
biggest set of problems.  
 
The expansion of these forms of non-standard work is best seen as a rather accidental 
process, which results from the evolution of work within an imperfect regulatory 
regime (Pocock, Buchanan and Campbell, 2004, p. 22). It is not, as in some European 
countries, a product of government decisions aimed at meeting employer demands for 
increased flexibility in an indirect fashion, while still preserving strong employment 
protection for permanent employees. Government action has been important, but it 
has tended to be targeted at the conditions of standard work, and it has paid less 
attention to the conditions associated with non-standard work.  
 
[B]Working time  
 
Some scholars identify working time as the major site of changed employment 
conditions since the mid-1980s (ACIRRT, 1999; Buchanan et al., 2006), and it is 
important to consider this dimension carefully. The changes incorporate some 
advances for employees, building on the long-term trajectory of improvement in leave 
entitlements and reduction in working hours. The reduced working hours campaign of 
the late 1970s was partially successful, leading to reductions in standard hours for 
many full-time employees, to 38 hours per week in most cases (generally taken in the 
form of rostered days off – RDOs). But since that time, signs of progress in meeting 
the individual or collective needs of employees have been harder to find. Campaigns 
have been mounted but few have met any success. For example, the 2002 effort to 
persuade the federal government to introduce a national scheme of paid maternity 
leave failed.  Some limited gains in other respects have been achieved. Entitlements to 
unpaid leave entitlements were boosted through Test Cases before the AIRC, first 
with unpaid parental leave in 1990, then with the Special Family Leave Test Case in 
1994, and most recently in the Family Provisions Test Case in 2004 to 2005 (Murray, 
2005). Efforts by trade unions at national level to secure controls on long hours 
through a “Reasonable Hours Test Case” in 2001 achieved a sympathetic hearing, 
though the outcome was weak and ineffective. It is possible to point to limited 
advances through collective bargaining at enterprise level. For example, provisions 
for paid maternity leave have been introduced into some agreements, but the 
entitlements are generally less than the ILO standard and are concentrated among 
well-paid full-time women, with most women who need it continuing to miss out 
(Baird, 2005). A recent study, based on a 2005 survey of mothers, indicates that 
around 34 per cent of all mothers who were employed in the 12 months prior to the 
birth of their child took some paid maternity leave (for an average duration of around 
11 weeks) (Whitehouse et al., 2007, pp. 107–108). 
 
Working-time changes can be charted through the experiences of full-time and part-
time workers. Among full-time employees, the most important and most suggestive 
change has been the lengthening of average hours, in sharp contrast both to the prior 
historical experience and to the contemporary trends in most other OECD countries. 
As Figure 4.5 shows, average actual weekly hours for full-time employees in 
Australia rose from 38.2 in 1982 to 41.9 in 2000, before falling back slightly to 41.2 
in the latest count in 2006. Both males and females show a similar pattern of increase, 
though the male mean remains higher than the female mean. The main component has 
been an increase in the proportion of full-time employees who have been working 
very long hours of 50 or more per week.   
 
FIGURE 4.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
This experience of lengthening full-time hours is unusual, though similar trends can 
be noted in countries such as the US, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The 
trend in Australia started from a relatively low base in the early 1980s, perhaps 
reflecting the legacy of a long history of achievements in reducing hours, but the 
current mean is high in comparison with most OECD countries, though still below the 
levels recorded in the Republic of Korea and Japan (Lee, 2004, pp. 41–43; Campbell, 
2007).11   
                                                 
11 Data on average annual hours for all employed persons are the usual basis for comparison, 
but they are distorted by virtue of the impact of part-time workers. As noted above, Australia 
has a very large component of part-time workers, which depresses the average compared to 
many other countries. Nevertheless, its annual average hours still appear quite long. In 2005 
 Analysis suggests that the increase in full-time hours is primarily due to an increase in 
unpaid overtime (Wooden et al., 1994; Campbell, 2007). Both the number of 
employees working unpaid overtime and the volume of this overtime in Australia 
were already significant in the early 1990s, but they have now become more 
significant. Data for the proportion of full-time employees working overtime on a 
regular basis show an increase from 39 per cent in 1993 to 46.1 per cent in 2003, 
much of the rise occurring among the group of workers not directly remunerated for 
their overtime (Table 4.5). As Table 4.5 indicates, overtime is heaviest among 
permanent full-time employees, but it also affects the small group of casual full-time 
employees. Though concentrated among managers and professional workers, the 
phenomenon of unpaid overtime seems to have spread to most occupational groups, 
signalling a deterioration in working-time conditions.    
 
TABLE 4.5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The experience of lengthening hours, often in the form of unpaid overtime, can be 
linked with the weakness of the regulation of standard hours and overtime. Many of 
the crucial elements found in other regulatory systems, such as maximum daily hours, 
maximum weekly limits and maximum overtime limits are missing, and the limits that 
do exist, such as the prescription of payment or time-off-in-lieu for overtime, are 
undermined by the prevalence of numerous gaps (Campbell, 2007, pp. 51–57). In 
addition, the absence of protective conditions around the use of overtime means that 
extra hours at the demand of the employer are more –or less mandatory. The already 
weak regulation has been further weakened in the course of labour-market 
deregulation. The new minimum floor of conditions introduced as part of the Work 
Choices package introduces a provision for a “maximum” of 38 ordinary weekly 
hours, but this does not function as any kind of maximum because it can be averaged 
over a year and can be supplemented by any number of “reasonable additional hours” 
(Cooney, Howe and Murray, 2006).   
 
                                                                                                                                            
the figure for all employed persons was 1,811 (OECD, 2006, p. 265, but cf. ABS, 2006j). 
This was broadly comparable with the United States (1,804), Japan (1,775) and New Zealand 
(1,809) but ahead of the United Kingdom (1,672), as well as all other EU nations.  
Other changes for full-time workers are often linked to longer hours. There has been a 
small decline in the proportion of full-time employees just working Monday to Friday 
(from 76.4 per cent in 1993 to 71.9 per cent in 2003). This seems to be mainly 
counterbalanced by a small increase in those working some weekends (ABS, 2003).12 
Similarly, the proportion of full-time employees who say that they are “able to work 
extra hours in order to take time off” has increased significantly from 36.2 per cent in 
1993 to 44.1 per cent in 2003 (ibid.). This is couched as an indicator of flexibility for 
the employee, but it is likely to be more ambiguous. Though it hints at the notion of a 
time-off-in-lieu (TOIL) system, it does not necessarily mean that the system is a 
formal one. On the contrary, evidence suggests that formal TOIL systems, such as the 
popular “flexitime” system in the public sector, have withered in the wake of 
privatization and new methods of public sector management (Heiler, 1998).13   
 
Just as flexitime has been eroded, so too have other entitlements traditionally 
associated with employee-oriented flexibility. The proportion of full-time employees 
entitled to RDOs dropped from 35 per cent in 1993 to 26.1 per cent in 2003 (ABS, 
2003). Fewer full-time employees have an entitlement to paid sick leave (ABS, 
2006g). A significant proportion of full-time employees (73.5 per cent in 2006 – ABS, 
2006h) claim to be able to choose when they take holidays. But the actual practice of 
taking annual holidays seems to be dropping, to the alarm of the tourism industry. 
This drop is mainly because many employees with an entitlement feel constrained in 
taking it up (Denniss, 2004).  
 
Changes are also apparent for part-time employees. The increase in the proportion of 
the workforce engaged in long working hours is counterbalanced by the sharp growth 
in the part-time workforce, disproportionately composed of women and young 
workers. This produces what is sometimes called a “polarization” in the distribution 
                                                 
12 A small increase in the proportion of workers doing some work on Sunday is evident from 
time-use data. However, Sunday work is still unusual, and it is associated with costs for 
workers, in particular in missing out on social activities with friends and relatives (Bittman, 
2005). 
13 The extent of flexible work arrangements is difficult to gauge. In a recent survey, a 
substantial proportion of full-time employees (41 per cent) claimed to have some say in start 
and finish times (ABS, 2006h). But in most cases this seemed to be an informal arrangement, 
either exercised autonomously by the employee or arranged with the informal agreement of 
the employer. Only a small proportion (9.1 per cent) stated that it was associated with a 
formal system of flexible hours.  
of weekly hours, whereby the phenomenon of “overemployment” is matched by a 
growth of short-hours work that is often “underemployment” (Campbell, 2007).  
 
Part of the story of part-time work in Australia concerns casual status. As part-time 
work increased, much of it was channelled into casual status. This offered strong 
advantages to employers. Though subject to some protective regulation (minimum 
start times, sometimes penalty rates for non-social periods), casual work lacked most 
of the conventional protections provided by working-time regulation. It thereby 
offered employers access to a powerful form of flexible working-time arrangement. 
Casual work could be used for small parcels of work, often at inconvenient times, and 
it could be used as a convenient reserve for occasions when demand might increase. A 
central feature was the ability to determine the number and timing of hours and to 
alter these at short notice (including reduce to zero). At the extreme, casual work 
shaded off into on-call arrangements, where labour time seemed available to 
employers on demand. Because women were disproportionately involved in part-time 
work, the story of casual status was – at least at first – a story of discrimination 
against women. 
 
How these deficits in protection work out in practice is highly variable. For a minority 
of casual part-time workers it does lead to intermittent employment and irregularity in 
the number and timing of working hours (ABS, 2003). In contrast to these casuals, 
part-time employees with permanent status seem to have access to more protections 
around working time. Though the detail varies according to the specific regulatory 
instrument, this would generally include access to regular hours and regular rosters 
and access to pro rata leave entitlements. But in practice, the evidence suggests 
substantial working-time insecurity for part-time permanent employees. This is partly 
an inheritance from a previous period, in which permanent part-time work was 
established in a segregated form, separate from standard work and without access to 
the full range of rights and entitlements. But it also appears to be a major product of 
changes initiated in the course of labour-market deregulation. It is difficult to get 
aggregate data, but case-study evidence in sectors such as banking, retail and 
hospitality points to substantial working-time changes affecting part-time permanent 
employees, including cocktail contracts that mix minimum hours under permanent 
conditions with additional hours under casual conditions, the imposition of working-
time conditions that had traditionally been associated with casual employment 
(irregular hours, more frequent starts, fewer weekly hours and a greater proportion of 
hours worked outside ordinary hours) and a loss of penalty rates (Deery and Mahony, 
1994; Whitehouse, Lafferty and Boreham., 1997; Junor, 1998; Knox, 2006).  
 
The working-time changes discussed in this sub-section testify to a process of 
fragmentation, which can be added to the fragmentation already identified with the 
growth of non-standard types of employment. What is entailed here is a process of 
fracturing within particular employment categories, including within what have been 
regarded as the categories covering “good” jobs. For example, the increase in the 
proportion of full-time workers working very long hours introduces a new set of 
fissures within the category of standard work. Indeed, it can be argued that this splits 
off an important group, who should no longer be regarded as working within the 
framework of a standard employment relationship, as conventionally defined (Bosch, 
2004). Similarly, the changes in permanent part-time work are fracturing that type of 
employment, marginalizing further many part-time workers.  
 
These working-time changes appear predominantly negative, but some aspects could 
be viewed more benignly. Experiences can be dependent on skill levels. The spread of 
results-based work within skilled sections of the full-time workforce is often 
associated with a sense of increased individual control over working-time 
arrangements. Working-time conditions are sometimes linked to complex trade-offs 
that may be acknowledged and even enthusiastically embraced by individual workers. 
Thus, heavy workloads and long hours may be seen as a fair exchange for accelerated 
promotion or enhanced access to bonuses. The case of part-time work is more 
uniformly negative, with extensive concern about the poor quality of the many part-
time jobs in Australia (Pocock, 2003; Watson et al., 2003). Reduced conditions seem 
to go hand-in-hand with reduced hours. But even here, where the trade-offs are more 
clearly constrained, many workers may continue to express satisfaction with the 
opportunity to work reduced hours. Indeed, part-time workers tend to report higher 
levels of job satisfaction in spite of poor terms and conditions (Wooden and Warren, 
2004; Watson, 2005). 
 
[B]Wages  
 Wages and incomes have been a central focus of the employment system, and this has 
intensified in the course of the changes over the past 15 years. However, the process 
of achieving wage rises has changed dramatically. The old system, based on National 
Wage Cases judged by the AIRC, supplemented by industry-level bargaining as well 
as over-award payments at enterprise level, has been replaced by a more chaotic 
system, in which many workers are isolated from conventional mechanisms for 
securing wage rises.  
 
The 1980s were marked by a regime of wage control, which tended to depress 
earnings growth for many employees (though incomes could be sustained by 
increases in the social wage). This period was also marked by a sharp increase in 
inequality in earnings, as real wages for the bottom deciles declined while executives 
at the top end enjoyed large rises (Watson et al., 2003). The period since the early 
1990s has seen a rise in nominal and real earnings for almost all workers, but with 
continued inequalities, including faster rates of increase for executive pay (ibid.). 
Among the groups that have not been able to recoup the previous losses is the bottom 
fifth of the full-time male workforce. For this group there has been no real wage 
growth since 1975 (Frijters and Gregory, 2006, p. 210).  
 
From 1997 to 2005, the AIRC ran “Safety Net Review” cases, which, in response to 
submissions from interested parties such as trade unions, employer associations, 
governments and welfare groups, considered the appropriateness of adjustments in 
federal award wages. Though all federal award wage rates were adjusted, most 
interest focused on the federal award minimum wage rate, which can be seen as an 
equivalent to an (adult) minimum wage (Eyraud and Saget, 2005).14 The AIRC 
consistently rejected the submissions of employers and the federal government, which 
claimed that raising wages would impede employment opportunities, and instead it 
granted moderate rises in wage rates. The effect was a rise in the minimum wage in 
real terms by around 10.6 per cent between 1996 and 2004 (NILS, 2006, pp. 7–8).  In 
                                                 
14 Reduced rates of pay for juniors, that is, workers under 21, are permitted. The reductions 
can be substantial. For example, in the Coles Supermarket Retail Award the pay rate for 
junior workers as a percentage of the adult rate ranged from 45 per cent (under 16) to 90 per 
cent (20 years).  This acts as a strong incentive for the employment of juniors in low-skill 
jobs.  
the wake of the 2005 Work Choices legislation, the new body responsible for 
adjusting minimum pay rates (and classification scales), AFPC, handed down its first 
judgment in October 2006, increasing the minimum wage (AFPC, 2006). Though this 
judgment was initially greeted warmly, it “represented a real wage fall of 0.9 percent 
on average for award-reliant employees” (Peetz, 2007, p. 36). Most researchers expect 
the long-term effect of the introduction of the new body, operating with quite different 
procedures, personnel and criteria to the AIRC, to be a slowdown of wage growth 
among lower paid employees (Waring, de Ruyter and Burgess, 2005). Together with 
the indirect effects of declining union strength, this suggests stagnation at the lower 
end of the labour market and a continued growth in earnings inequality (Watson et al., 
2003, pp. 107–131).  
 
In spite of the fact that the minimum wage is seen as high in international comparison, 
concern about the “working poor” has increased, and a low pay sector, defined as 
comprising full-time workers whose earnings are less than 2/3 of median earnings, 
has emerged. This sector is now relatively substantial, comprising around 14 per cent 
of all employees, although its size does not seem to have increased in recent years 
(OECD, 2006, p. 175). On the other hand, there is some evidence of poor and 
declining hourly wages for part-time workers compared to full-time workers. 
Comparison of wage rates between permanent and casual employees is more difficult, 
because the hourly rates mean different things for the two groups (pay for an hour of 
labour or pay for an hour that might be either at work or on some form of leave). 
Watson (2005) suggests that, in spite of the apparent effect of a casual loading, casual 
workers are penalized.   
 
The issue of low earnings overlaps with irregular earnings, stemming from 
intermittent employment and irregular hours. This can be a particular problem for 
casuals, who are in jobs that are less stable. In addition, casual workers lack access to 
protections that can smooth earnings and are only paid for the hours they are at work. 
As a result, they are vulnerable to employer decisions to change the number of hours 
and also vulnerable to the intervention of outside events such as public holidays, 
annual plant closedown, sickness and personal emergencies.  
 
The share of national income going to wages is continuing to decline. At 53.6 per cent 
of total factor income in 2006, the wages share is at its lowest level since June 1970. 
On the other hand, the profit share, currently standing at 26.8 per cent of total factor 
income, is at its highest level since the start of the series in 1960 (ABS, 2006f).  
 
[B]Gender equality and work–family balance  
 
Pressures for gender equity arise from different sources, but one powerful source is 
the increased employment rates for women. A substantial part of this increase flows in 
to full-time work, but, as noted above, another substantial part, especially women with 
dependent children, is taken up in part-time jobs.   
 
There is a mixed record of achievement in gender equity. One long-term trend is 
towards more equal access to higher education and to professional jobs. Another 
important trend is towards a decrease in overt discrimination against women. The 
labour regulation system, in its earliest form, was built up around a male 
breadwinner/female homemaker model, which incorporated discriminatory provisions 
against women. Thus wages for men were framed as a family wage, while wages for 
women were set at a lesser rate (Whitehouse, 2004). Similarly, some awards or 
regulations inserted bars on the employment of married women. Overt discrimination 
in wage rates persisted for several decades, but was removed in a series of equal pay 
judgments from the industrial tribunals in the early 1970s, while marriage bars 
disappeared in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result of these initiatives, the gender pay 
gap narrowed – though it never completely disappeared – and Australia moved ahead 
of many other nations on this important indicator of gender equity (see Figure 4.6). 
 
 
FIGURE 4.6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The achievements of the early 1970s pointed to the positive potential of the award 
system as a vehicle for promoting gender equity.  This positive potential was further 
taken up in subsequent years, with several Test Cases, culminating in the Family 
Provisions Test Case in 2004 to 2005. Action by the tribunals was supplemented by 
legislative initiatives, in areas such as sex discrimination and equal employment 
opportunity.  
 
However, these advances have stalled in the most recent period.  Gender occupational 
segregation persists, with women concentrated within a narrow band of occupations in 
the service sector (Grimshaw, Whitehouse and Zetlin, 2003). There has been little 
progress in improving the quality of the part-time jobs that many women have taken 
up. As noted above, the majority of these part-time jobs are casual and there are signs 
of a deterioration of conditions even among “permanent” part-time jobs. There has 
been little movement towards narrowing the remaining gender pay gap, and indeed 
much contemporary commentary focuses on the threat of a widening gap. The 
aggregate data confirm the impression of stasis (Figure 4.7). Preston (2007) suggests 
that underneath the aggregate figures is a range of gender pay gaps that exhibit 
worrying trends. Included here are the gaps according to part-time status and casual 
status. Different methods of pay determination can also affect the gap, disadvantaging 
female employees concentrated in the award-reliant sector. Preston (2007) suggests 
that the widespread fears that women would lose out in labour-market deregulation 
are proving to be well justified.  
 
FIGURE 4.7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The issue of gender equality can be seen to overlap with the issue of work/family or 
work/life balance. More people with caring responsibilities are in the workplace, yet 
workplaces remain relatively inflexible and resistant to accommodating the needs of 
employees. The connection between the sphere of paid work and the sphere of life 
outside has become increasingly a site of pressure or, as one author puts it, a site of 
collision (Pocock, 2003). The precise pressures on employees take different forms 
(Campbell and Charlesworth, 2004, pp. 38–39). They are experienced in different 
ways at different phases of the life course, but they appear particularly strong around 
the birth and care of young children.  
 
Australia is faring poorly in handling these pressures. This is evident in data on 
workforce participation, including the large drop in participation for mothers of young 
children, and in the evidence of mounting public concern with work/family balance. 
The pressures can be eased somewhat by what are called family-friendly measures at 
the workplace. Particularly important are short-term and long-term leave 
arrangements, good quality part-time work and employee-oriented flexible work 
arrangements. Five points seem to be widely accepted in the literature on family-
friendly benefits in Australia: (a) family-friendly benefits are provided through a 
patchwork of different methods; (b) though it is difficult to make exact estimates, 
most family-friendly benefits provided through firm-level initiatives seem to be 
available only to a minority of employees, predominantly composed of higher-skilled 
workers in large and public sector enterprises; (c) casual employment represents a 
significant gap in eligibility for family-friendly benefits; (d) there are problems with 
the quality of part-time employment, thereby limiting its claim to be family-friendly; 
and (e) even among those who are formally eligible for family-friendly benefits, there 
are substantial difficulties in take up as a result of factors such as unsupportive 
organizational cultures, long hours and work intensification (ibid., pp. 42–50). 
 
Though family-friendly measures can be found in selected firms, the missing element 
in Australia is the initiative to ensure that they are generalized through the workforce. 
The most glaring example is paid maternity leave. Australia remains one of only two 
OECD countries – the other is the US – without a national paid maternity leave 
scheme. The spread of such measures has been impeded by the attitude of past federal 
governments and by the dominant labour regulation arrangements, which treat such 
measures as an item to be granted or denied according to the choice of the employer. 
At the same time, concern is growing that labour-market deregulation may be helping 
to spread what can be called “family-hostile” measures such as arbitrary management, 
poor working-time schedules and casual employment conditions. 
 
[B]Health and safety 
 
Health and safety is largely regulated by independent statutes, developed at state 
rather than federal level. All states have reasonably comprehensive legislation, 
modelled on the principles established in the early 1970s by the Robens Report in the 
United Kingdom (Creighton and Stewart, 2005, pp. 584–618). This system has been 
so far spared the direct changes pursued so vigorously at federal level, and it remains 
effective in inhibiting dangerous and unsafe practices in many workplaces.  
 In 2003 to 2004 there were 332 work-related traumatic injury fatalities in Australia, 
equal to a rate of 3.5 for every 100,000 members of the employed civilian labour 
force (ASCC, 2006b, p. 17), which is somewhat lower than the estimated average for 
the established market economies of 4.2 fatal occupational accidents for every 
100,000 workers (Hämäläinen, Takala and Saarala, 2006, p. 145).  
 
Recent ABS data suggest that 6.4 per cent of all people who worked at some time 
during the 12 months from 2005 to 2006 experienced a work-related injury or illness 
during that period. The most common types of injury or illness were sprains or strains, 
followed by cuts or open wounds, and chronic joint or muscle conditions. Over half 
(58 per cent) took some time off work, with 28 per cent taking five days or more off 
work (ABS, 2006d). Australia has the world’s highest incidence rate of malignant 
mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer. Incidence rates have been increasing since 1965 
and it is believed these high rates are related to the extensive use and production of 
asbestos in past decades (NOHSC, 2004).  
 
We can draw some information on trends from data for workers’ compensation, 
though these are limited by the circumstances of their collection. The incidence rate of 
compensated work-related fatalities fell from 5.4 to 2.9 per 100,000 employees 
between 1996 to 1997 and 2002 to 2003, suggesting that Australian workplaces may 
have become safer since 1996. Similarly, the incidence rate for compensated work-
related injury or disease fell from 23 to 17 claims per 1,000 employees over the same 
period (ASCC, 2006a; b). Compensation claims for almost all nature of injury and 
illness have decreased over the seven-year period to 2002 to 2003, with the major 
exception of mental disorders, which increased by 37 per cent. Among the actions or 
events causing the injury or illness, mental stress was the only one that increased 
between 1996 to 1997 and 2002 to 2003 (ASCC, 2006a, pp. 28, 30).  
 
In spite of this overall positive assessment, concern is mounting about some of the 
implications of changing labour regulation and changing work patterns. The current 
regulatory system gives an important role to employee safety representatives and 
management–employee safety committees, and these are threatened by the federal 
restrictions on trade union action and participation at the workplace.  In addition, the 
federal government is promising a national approach, which would displace the state 
systems of occupational health and safety. 
 
The consequences of the growth of certain forms of non-standard employment, 
especially in areas such as road transport and construction, has been one focus of 
recent research (Quinlan, 2003; Johnstone and Quinlan, 2005). Workers in non-
standard forms of employment such as casual work and agency work seem more 
vulnerable to accidents and occupational illnesses. The growth of casual employment 
has been identified in particular with significant hidden health and safety costs 
(McNamara, 2006). Similarly, the issue of job stress has attracted increasing attention 
in recent years. A major study in the state of Victoria (La Montagne et al., 2006) used 
a measure of job stress developed from the Karasek demand/control model, together 
with data from an empirical study of over 1,000 working Victorians. The study 
showed that job stress was making a major contribution to ill health, including 
cardiovascular disease and depression, and that the most vulnerable groups were those 
with high demands and low control in their job.  
 
[A]4. New issues and social debates 
 
The debate on changing employment conditions in Australia is growing. In the 1980s, 
a broad consensus about the deficiencies of the previous employment regime and the 
need to create a more open economy underpinned the policy discussion. However, as 
government initiatives extended from product and financial markets to labour 
markets, and as the outcomes for individual workers became clearer, more disquiet 
has emerged.   
 
Discussion and debate on changing employment conditions cover a range of issues, 
some familiar in other countries, some less familiar. The “ageing society” is the 
subject of an emerging background debate. Unemployment and joblessness is a 
traditional concern, linked in to policy discussion around wages policy and social 
security. Low-paid work is a concern for some, though others argue that earnings 
inequality is less significant than income inequality and that in any case low-paid 
workers are not necessarily in low-paid households.  Concerns around non-standard 
employment, including in particular casual employment, working-time patterns and 
job quality, have been staples of labour-market research and public discussion for the 
past ten years. This research is now voluminous, but it has had little impact so far on 
policy. Responses from government officials, often backed up by commentators from 
right-wing think tanks, have typically conceded the facts but sought to deny the policy 
implications, often shifting the subject either to the more flattering data on 
macroeconomic indicators or to attitudinal data suggesting that most workers are 
relatively satisfied with their jobs (Australian Government, 2003).    
 
One crucial current debate concerns productivity growth. A key rationale for 
neoliberal policy changes to labour regulation was the need to boost lagging 
productivity growth. Some economists have drawn attention to data for changes in 
multi-factor productivity in the mid- to late 1990s. They argue that there was a 
“productivity surge” that could be plausibly linked to labour-market reforms, 
providing potent evidence for the value of the policy changes of the early 1990s 
(Parham, 2000, p. 2005). Subsequent discussion has challenged this view, and the 
evidence now looks questionable: the rate of growth of multi-factor productivity has 
retreated in the subsequent years, in spite of the continuation of labour-market 
reforms. Critics suggest that even the growth in the earlier period is something of a 
statistical illusion (Hancock, 2005; Quiggin, 2006). Quiggin (2006) argues that it is at 
best a temporary blip, most plausibly related to temporary factors such as recovery 
from the recession and unsustainable increases in work intensity. The debate on 
productivity extends into a discussion of the likely impact of current and prospective 
changes on productivity (Burgess and Waring, 2005). In particular attention has been 
given to the impact of individual contracting on productivity, but the verdict seems to 
be negative (Peetz, 2006).  
 
Also important is a current debate on skill shortages. The conventional view in 
business circles sees evidence of large-scale shortages and over-full employment in 
many areas. As in the case of the debate on the “ageing society”, this is in turn seen as 
necessitating mobilization of reserves of labour. For employers concerned with skill 
shortages, the immediate remedy tends to be sought in immigration policy, through 
calls to boost immigrant numbers, to broaden the categories defined as skilled in the 
general skilled migration programme, and to allow easier access to temporary migrant 
workers. On the other hand, critics have suggested that talk of tight labour markets is 
often exaggerated. The notion of “skill shortage” is slippery (Richardson, 2007). Skill 
shortages are real, but some can be related back to the impact of specific employer 
practices, including the employer retreat from training, especially apprenticeships in 
skilled trades, and the degradation of job quality in areas such as nursing and 
maintenance work (Watson et al., 2003, pp. 151–164). A market approach to training 
has been dominant for the past ten years, but it now seems to be running up against its 
limits (Hall and Lansbury, 2006).  
 
One element of the debate on skill shortages concerns its possible effect as a 
countervailing pressure on the impact of recent changes in labour regulation. It is 
sometimes suggested that skill shortages could make employers “wary of being seen 
to cut conditions for fear of being unable to attract or retain good staff” (Stewart, 
2006, pp. 53–54). Again it is useful to be cautious. Though labour shortages are a 
major issue in certain trades and professions, and in certain geographic areas, they 
may not be as widespread as is often feared. It is hard to resist the conclusion that 
labour and skill shortages are unevenly distributed, and skill shortages can “still co-
exist with plentiful labour supply in low-pay labour markets” (Briggs and Buchanan, 
2005, p. 185). Nor is the link between skill shortages and employer caution as 
straightforward as is often suggested. Certainly skill is vital in giving workers some 
bargaining strength, and skill shortages may slow down employer initiatives. 
However, the key pressures on employers derive from product markets, and there is a 
danger that competitive advantages secured by one employer as a result of reduced 
wages and conditions will force other employers to follow suit (Briggs, 2005). 
 
Employer strategies have not received the attention they deserve, and in a more 
deregulated environment these may come even more to the fore. There is some 
concern that changing financial markets and the dominance of “shareholder value” 
have shaped employer strategies and pushed them too far in the direction of the 
pursuit of short-term gains (Watson et al., 2003). This concern is growing, as financial 
markets again experience the return of leveraged buyouts from private equity groups.  
 
The policy settings of the last ten years remained fixed while the federal Coalition 
government was fixed in office. Alternative principles and policies have been slow to 
emerge, but a few signs can be detected. States such as Victoria have experimented 
with new initiatives to restore regulatory protection. At the crucial federal level, 
awareness that the most recent changes do not involve “deregulation” but rather just 
different, often highly prescriptive, regulation, has helped to focus interest in the 
possibility of different regulatory principles. Similarly, the almost-complete demise of 
the old system of awards has cleared the way for some new thinking. A simple 
defence of traditional institutions and achievements is no longer practicable or 
plausible. Instead, critics are obliged to put forward their ideas on alternative paths 
towards modernization of the employment system. Inspired by this logic, the central 
trade union body, working in close collaboration with the Labor Party, developed a 
model for an altered labour regulation system at the federal level. This would be 
based on a stronger floor of minimum conditions and provisions for union recognition 
in order to support single-employer collective bargaining, though it would still stop 
short of full support for multi-employer collective bargaining (ACTU, 2006; see 
Briggs, 2007). Some social-democratic circles have sought to develop the European 
ideas of transitional labour markets (Howe, 2007). Similarly the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC) has sought to intervene in the 
work/family debate with a major report that supports the “valued care/shared work” 
model (HREOC, 2007). These are important straws in the wind, though the gulf 
between the world of research and the world of policy is yet to be bridged.  
 
The new federal Labor government is entering office with a policy that promises to 
remove the worst excesses of Work Choices (ALP 2007), for example by restoring 
unfair dismissal rights and by removing opportunities for employers to lower 
conditions through AWAs.  However, it seems likely that the Labor government will 
retain several aspects of the regulatory framework introduced by the previous 
government.  Much will depend on the unfolding of debate and discussion in the next 
few years.      
 
[A]5. Conclusions  
 
The distinctive employment system that characterized Australia for much of the 
twentieth century is changing. The story of employment conditions is mixed. The 
positive results promised by labour-market deregulation seem difficult to identify. But 
there are some positive signs in the labour markets that seem propelled by other 
factors, including in particular the wave of economic prosperity experienced since the 
mid-1990s.    
 
The most striking aspect of change concerns labour regulation, which has shifted 
slowly but surely away from traditional principles of security for employees towards 
promotion of increased labour-market flexibility for employers. Australia offers a 
radical case of labour-market deregulation, inspired by neoliberal principles. The 
employment system needed to be modernized, in response to changed economic and 
political conditions and globalization, but the direction of change seems poorly 
chosen. There are few signs of the promised benefits in terms of productivity growth. 
Moreover, the outcome seems a puzzle as well as a disappointment. Instead of the 
simple, transparent and open system promised by ideals of deregulation, the outcome 
seems complex and contradictory.  It presents an ongoing challenge for reform. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 4.1. Award coverage rates, public and private sectors, May 1990 
(proportion of employees) 
 
 Covered by awards 
determinations and 
collective 
agreements 
Not covered Total (000) 
    
Public  97.8 2.2 1694.8 
Private 72.4 27.6 3957.4 
    
All sectors 80.0 20.0 5652.2 
 
Source: ABS, 1990. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Methods of setting pay, public and private sectors, May 2006 
(proportion of employees) 
 
 Award 
only 
Collective agreement Individual arrangement 
  Registered Unregistere
d 
Registered  Unregistered Working 
proprietor of 
incorporated 
business¹ 
       
Public 2.4* 92.9 0.2* 2.0 2.6 – 
Private 23.1 24.4 3.8 3.3 39.0 6.3 
       
All sectors       
  Male 14.7 34.6 3.3 3.6 36.6 7.2 
  Female 23.4 41.7 2.8 2.5 26.7 2.9 
  Persons  19.0 38.1 3.0 3.1 31.7 5.1 
Notes: * Estimate has a relative standard error of 25–50% and should be used with caution. 
¹Owner-managers of incorporated enterprises are encompassed by the standard definition of employee 
in Australia and therefore also find their way into these data. They are placed in a separate column 
here, but in previous surveys in 2000 and 2002 they were classified to “unregistered individual 
arrangements”. 
Source: ABS, 2006i. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Employed persons by full-time and part-time status,¹ by sex, 1994–
2005  
Year² Male Female Persons 
 Full 
time 
 
 
000 
Part 
time 
 
 
000 
% of all 
male 
employees 
Full 
time 
 
 
000 
Part 
time 
 
 
000 
 
% of all 
female 
employees 
Full 
time 
 
 
000 
Part 
time 
 
 
000 
% of total 
employees 
Total 
 
 
000 
           
1994 4023.7 514.5 11.3 1918.7 1440.6 42.9 5942.4 1955.0 24.8 7897.4 
1995 4155.1 530.2 11.3 2016.8 1529.2 43.1 6171.9 2059.4 25.0 8231.3 
1996 4179.6 551.1 11.6 2057.5 1544.6 42.9 6237.1 2095.7 25.2 8332.8 
1997 4140.8 576.8 12.2 2018.4 1588.3 44.0 6159.2 2165.0 26.0 8324.3 
1998 4234.8 582.5 12.1 2093.9 1644.5 44.0 6328.7 2226.9 26.0 8555.6 
1999 4305.6 606.2 12.3 2093.7 1686.7 44.6 6399.2 2292.9 26.4 8692.1 
2000 4355.2 654.0 13.1 2216.4 1764.7 44.3 6571.6 2418.7 26.9 8990.3 
2001 4295.4 727.2 14.5 2205.4 1834.0 45.4 6500.7 2561.2 28.3 9061.9 
2002 4356.5 766.4 15.0 2235.5 1885.9 45.8 6592.0 2652.3 28.7 9244.3 
2003 4422.7 773.6 14.9 2237.4 1962.8 46.7 6660.1 2736.4 29.1 9396.5 
2004 4502.7 775.5 14.7 2328.3 1971.5 45.6 6831.0 2746.9 28.7 9578.0 
2005 4688.2 801.6 14.6 2388.3 2098.6 46.8 7076.4 2900.2 29.1 9976.7 
Notes; ¹ Persons employed full time are those who usually worked 35 hours or more a week (in all 
jobs) and those who, although usually working less than 35 hours a week, worked 35 hours or more 
during the reference week; persons employed part time are those employed persons who usually 
worked less than 35 hours a week (in all jobs) and either did so during the reference week, or were not 
at work in the reference week. 
²August. 
 
Source: ABS 2006a. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Different types of employment, Australia 2007 (% of workforce) 
 
 
Weekly 
hours 
Employment relationship 
Employees  Self-employed workers 
Permanent Casual Fixed 
term 
 Contractors Non- 
contractors 
Full time 48.6* 3.6 3.5    
Part time 12.3 15.2 1.7    
Total 61.0 18.8 5.3  8.9 
(2.6)# 
5.9 
Notes: *Standard employment 
#Dependent contractors  
 
Source: Van Wanrooy et al., 2007, p. 20 (with additional data supplied on request).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5. Full-time employees¹, whether overtime worked on a regular basis and 
whether overtime is paid or not paid, 1993—2003 (%) 
 
Year² Full-time 
employees 
working 
overtime  
 
 
Paid for 
overtime 
 
 
 
 
Not paid³ 
 
 
 
 
 Permanent 
full-time 
employees 
working 
overtime 
 
Casual full-
time 
employees 
working 
overtime 
 
1993 39.0 15.6  23.5  40.0 28.1 
1995 43.0 17.2  25.9  44.1 33.0 
1997 41.2 15.4  25.8   42.5 30.1 
2000 40.8 – –  42.5 30.7 
2003 46.1 17.3 28.8  48.1 33.3 
Notes: ¹Includes owner-managers of incorporated enterprises; for every year except 1993 it excludes 
persons aged 15–19 years who were attending school at the time of the survey. 
² August for 1993, 1995 and 1997; November for 2000 and 2003. 
³ “Not paid” comprises all those who stated that their most recent period of overtime was “unpaid 
overtime”, “included in salary package”, “time off in lieu”, or “other arrangements”. 
 
Source: ABS 2003 and various issues.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Changes in employment rates for working age persons by sex, 
Australia, 1978–2006 (%) 
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Source: ABS, Labour Force, Australia Data Cubes 6291.0.55.001, Table 01 
 
Figure 4.2. Unemployed persons and underemployed persons, Australia, 1978–
2006 (%)  
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Note: The underemployment1 rate measures part-time workers who prefer to work more hours as a 
percentage of the labour force. 
The underemployment2 rate is a derivative of the underemployment1 rate, designed to conform more 
closely to international standards (ABS, 2006e). It starts with part-time workers who want more hours, 
but it differs in two main respects: first, it includes some full-time workers (those who are usually full 
time but are working less than 35 hours in the reference week for “economic” reasons); and, second, it 
does not count all part-time workers who want more hours but only those who were available for more 
hours (in rough parallel to the measures of unemployment).  
 
Source: ABS Labour Force Australia, Detailed, Quarterly, August 2006, Cat. no. 6291.0.55.003; ABS 
Underemployed Workers Australia, September 2005, cat. no. 6252.0, cat. no. 6265.0; and ABS Labour 
Force Australia, Cat. No. 6202.0.55.001. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Employees in full-time “permanent” work, Australia, 1984–2006 
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Source: From 1989 data are from ABS Cat. No. 6310.0, varied years; for details on earlier sources see 
Campbell  2004, p. 88. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Employees in “casual” work, Australia, 1984–2006 
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Source: From 1989 data are from ABS Cat. No. 6310.0, varied years; for details on earlier sources see 
Campbell, 2004, p. 88. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Average actual weekly hours for full-time employees by sex, 
Australia, 1978–2006  
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Source: Figures for 1978 to 1984 are from ABS, The Labour Force Australia: Historical Summary 
1966 to 1984, cat. no. 6204.0; figures from 1985 are from ABS data cubes, 6291.0.55.03, Labour 
Force Australia, Table e04. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD online statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Gender pay ratios, based 
on female/male median weekly 
earnings for full-time employees, 
Australia, UK and US, 1970-2005 
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Figure 7: Gender pay equity ratios, total hourly earnings of non-managerial 
employees and total weekly earnings of full-time adult employees, Australia 1996-
2006 
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Source of data: ABS 6306.0, 6302.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
